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Lebel and Paunonen (2011) highlight that despite their importance and popularity in both
theoretical and applied research, many implicit measures continue to be plagued by a
persistent and troublesome issue—low reliability. In their paper, they offer a conceptual
analysis of the relationship between reliability, power and replicability, and then provide
a series of recommendations for researchers interested in using implicit measures in
an experimental setting. At the core of their account is the idea that reliability can be
equated with statistical power, such that “lower levels of reliability are associated with
decreasing probabilities of detecting a statistically significant effect, given one exists in
the population” (p. 573). They also take the additional step of equating reliability and
replicability. In our commentary, we draw attention to the fact that there is no direct, fixed
or one-to-one relation between reliability and power or replicability. More specifically,
we argue that when adopting an experimental (rather than a correlational) approach,
researchers strive to minimize inter-individual variation, which has a direct impact on
sample based reliability estimates. We evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the
LeBel and Paunonen’s recommendations and refine them where appropriate.
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In their original paper, Lebel and Paunonen (2011) draw attention to a measurement revolution
that has unfolded within social psychology over the past two decades and that has shaped
methodological, theoretical and empirical developments outside of its borders. For much of the
past century, researchers relied on a set of direct procedures such as semantic differential scales,
feeling thermometers, and questionnaires when assessing people’s attitudes, beliefs, and personality
characteristics. These procedures are often deployed under the assumption that people not only
have introspective access, but also the opportunity and motivation to accurately report on their
psychological attributes or content. Yet it is well-known that this assumption is often violated in
socially-sensitive situations (e.g., evaluations of racial, gender or religious groups), demand prone
domains (e.g., job hiring or clinical assessment contexts), or instances where the individual lacks
introspective access to the content under investigation (see Payne and Gawronski, 2010, for a book
length treatment).
These limitations sparked a methodological revolution centered on the development and
refinement of a new class of indirect procedures. At their core, indirect procedures seek to
measure in a way that (a) circumvents a person’s ability to strategically control their behavior
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as well as (b) captures psychological processes, attributes, or
content in ways that does not depend on introspective access.
A multitude of indirect procedures have now been developed
and many have seen widespread application both inside and
outside of psychological science, from clinical psychology (Roefs
et al., 2011), to cognitive (Hahn and Gawronski, 2015), and
developmental psychology (Dunham et al., 2008), as well as in
neuroscience (Stanley et al., 2008), political (Nosek et al., 2010),
and consumer science (Gregg and Klymowsky, 2013). The most
influential of these procedures include the Implicit Association
Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998), evaluative priming (e.g., Fazio,
2001), and the Affective Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne
et al., 2005; for more see Nosek et al., 2011; Gawronski and De
Houwer, 2014)1.
Lebel and Paunonen (2011) highlight that despite their
theoretical and applied implications, the vast majority of implicit
measures suffer from unacceptably low levels of reliability,
especially when compared to their explicit counterparts (see also
Cunningham et al., 2001; Fazio and Olson, 2003; Gawronski
et al., 2007). These reliability estimates (usually based on split-
half correlations or coefficient alphas) range from “abysmally
low (Bosson et al., 2000) to moderate (Kawakami and Dovidio,
2001)” (Lebel and Paunonen, 2011, p. 572) and are argued to
have serious knock-on effects for cumulative scientific progress.
In their paper, Lebel and Paunonen equate the issue of reliability
with the issue of statistical power, and suggest that “lower
levels of reliability are associated with decreasing probabilities
of detecting a statistically significant effect, given one exists in
the population” (p. 573). They also take an additional step and
equate the issue of reliability with replicability. In particular,
they suggest that “randommeasurement error, which contributes
to the unreliability of measures, can prevent an experiment
from being exactly repeatable” (p. 571). In other words, higher
amounts of random measurement error contaminate a measure’s
score and decreases the likelihood that researchers will be able
to replicate their own or other’s findings. To put it differently,
“given that the probability of replication is simply a special case of
statistical power (i.e., probability of replication is the probability
of detecting a statistically significant effect given one exists in the
population and that the effect has already been found in at least
one sample), it follows that decreasing levels of reliability should
be associated with reduced likelihood of replication” (p. 573).
To test this idea, Lebel and Paunonen (2011) conducted a
Monte Carlo simulation to examine the effect of different levels
of reliability on the replicability of experimental findings in
the context of implicit measures. The authors found that the
probability of replicating an experimental effect “systematically
decreased as the random measurement error contaminating
the scores increased. This pattern was especially pronounced
1In-line with De Houwer (2006) we define a procedure as “direct” or “indirect”
based on the way in which the measurement context is arranged to capture the
behavior of interest (e.g., verbal, speeded categorization of stimuli). We also define
the outcome derived from direct procedures as an “explicit” measure, and the
outcome derived from indirect procedures as an “implicit” measure based on the
properties of the psychological attribute under investigation. Put simply, “implicit”
and “explicit” refer to the operating conditions under which a psychological
attribute influences measurement outcomes rather than the procedure itself.
for “medium” and “large” population effect sizes and for
moderate to large sample sizes (i.e., N equal to or greater
than 30 per condition)” (p. 577). Based on the results of their
simulation, LeBel and Paunonen put forward three main ideas.
First, they argue that random measurement error should be
equated with the concept of reliability—and as a result—the
probability of replicating an experimental effect decreases as
random measurement error (i.e., low reliability) increases. In
other words, empirical results that are influenced by random
measurement error cannot be replicated exactly whereas results
uncontaminated by random measurement error are more likely
to replicable (i.e., probability of replication increases as a function
of reliability). Second, they argue that researchers should strive to
improve implicit measures that suffer from unacceptable levels
of reliability and gravitate toward measures known to have
acceptable psychometric properties. Finally, when using implicit
measures, researchers should routinely and accurately report
reliability, and in the case of experimental work, provide separate
reliability estimates for each and every experimental condition.
The above conceptual analysis and associated recommendations
certainly seem reasonable on first glance. Yet we believe that these
recommendations and the assumptions they are built upon are
not as straightforward as one would initially suspect. As we shall
see, there is no direct or one-to-one mathematical relationship
between the reliability of an implicit measure and the likelihood
of replicating an experimental outcome. Random measurement
error and reliability refer to two very different psychometric
concepts that cannot be used interchangeably. By equating these
two concepts, Lebel and Paunonen (2011) arrive at a number
of conclusions that might undermine the interpretation and
evaluation of data as well as the development of new procedures.
The current commentary has two main goals. First, it aims
to provide a quick primer for those interested in the concept of
reliability and its relation to implicit measures in experimental
contexts. We recognize that this primer will likely contain
statistical and psychometric concepts (reliability, power and
replicability) that some readers are already familiar with. Our aim
is to demonstrate when these concepts are combined, a number
of conclusions emerge that are, at first sight, counter-intuitive,
especially for researchers who are less familiar with psychometric
theory and whomerely employ implicit measures as tools in their
experimental work. Second, LeBel and Paunonen made several
recommendations for the experimental use of implicit measures.
Like any recommendations, these have the potential to influence
the actions of editors and reviewers, as well as the activities of
the researcher. We therefore aim to evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of these recommendations, and refine them where
appropriate.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
RELIABILITY AND REPLICABILITY
At the core of LeBel and Paunonen’s paper is the notion
that reliability is intimately connected with the concepts of
statistical power and replicability. To support this assertion, they
point to a number of publications demonstrating a positive
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relationship between the reliability of a dependent variable and
the statistical power needed to observe differences between
experimental groups or conditions where such differences exist
(Sutcliffe, 1958; Rogers and Hopkins, 1988). Yet contrary to their
suggestions, the relationship between reliability and statistical
power is not a simple, positive or direct one (see Overall and
Woodward, 1975, 1976; Fleiss, 1976; Nicewander and Price,
1978; Hopkins and Hopkins, 1979; Williams and Zimmerman,
1981; Overall and Ashby, 1991; Williams et al., 1995). For
nearly 50 years, the link between reliability and power has been
debated in the psychometric literature, with several authors
suggesting a positive relation between these two concepts (e.g.,
Sutcliffe, 1958; Rogers and Hopkins, 1988) while others argue
for the very opposite (negative) relationship (e.g., Overall and
Woodward, 1975, 1976; Nicewander and Price, 1978). Thus,
despite suggestions to the contrary, there appears to be a
paradox in arguing for a general or fixed mathematical relation
between reliability and power (for more see Williams et al.,
1995).
This has serious implications for Lebel and Paunonen’s (2011)
original argument. If there is no fixed relationship between
reliability and power, and if replicability is “simply a special case
of statistical power” (p. 573), then it follows that there is no
general or fixed relation between reliability and replicability. A
simple demonstration might help to illustrate our point more
clearly. In their original paper, LeBel and Paunonen ran a Monte
Carlo simulation to examine the impact of unreliability in a
dependent variable on the replicability of results for a simple
two-group between-subjects test of means. This simulation
revealed that the probability of replicating an experimental
effect systematically decreased as the randommeasurement error
contaminating the scores increased. We set out to replicate these
findings, but instead of using simulations, we arrived at an exact
solution via the formula for calculating power for a two-sample t-
test with equal variances (i.e., σ 21 = σ 22 = σ 2). Working through
this example will illustrate the paradox of equating reliability with
power or replicability.
First, let X denote observed scores, which can be defined as
the sum of unobserved true-scores (T) and error-scores (E). Now,
following classical test theory, we can define reliability as the ratio
of true-score variance to observed-score variance, ρ XX′=σ 2T/σ 2X ,
with X = T + E, or, we can define reliability in terms of true-
and error-score variances, ρ XX′ = 1− σ
2
E
σ 2T+σ
2
E
and σ 2X = σ 2T + σ 2E
(Lord and Novick, 1968). Let N be the number of observation
in each condition, δ the smallest relevant difference or effect size
and δ > 0. Then for a given alpha (α), the power pi (δ) can be
calculated as follows:
pi (δ) = 1− F
N−1,
√
Nδ
σ
(tN−1,α),
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the non-
central t-distribution, with N − 1 degrees of freedom and with
non-centrality parameter
√
N δ/σ .
In their original Monte Carlo simulation, Lebel and Paunonen
(2011) fixed the true-score variance (σ 2T) at 1.00 while allowing
the error-score variance (σ 2E ) to vary in order to guarantee a priori
FIGURE 1 | Exact power as a function of reliability when true-score
variance is fixed at 1.00.
levels of reliability (i.e., σ 2E = (1− ρXX)/ρXX). Consequently, the
observed score variance (σ 2) used in the above power function
can be expressed as (σ 2 = σ 2X = 1.00 + (1 − ρXX)/ρXX).
The pattern of results obtained from our power formula for
ρXX ∈ {0.10, 0.20, . . . , 1.00}, N ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 50}, α = 0.05,
and δ = 0.50, can be observed in Figure 1. When true-score
variance is fixed, our power function reveals an almost identical
(positive) relation between power and reliability as seen in the
author’s original paper.
Now imagine that instead of true-score variance we fix error-
score variance (σ 2E ) at 1.00 and allow the true-score variance
to vary as a function of different levels of reliability. In this
case the true-score variance as a function of reliability is (σ 2T =
1.00
1−ρXX −1.00). The observed score variance can then be expressed
as (σ 2 = σ 2X = 1.001−ρXX ). The pattern of results obtained
from our power formula for (ρXX ∈ {0.00, 0.10, . . . , 0.90}, ∈
{10, 20, . . . , 50}, α = 0.05, and δ = 0.50), can be observed in
Figure 2. When error-score variance is fixed, our power function
reveals an entirely opposite (negative) relationship between
power and reliability as compared to that reported by Lebel and
Paunonen (2011).
The above example clearly illustrates the paradox of equating
reliability with power or replicability. Consequently, Lebel and
Paunonen (2011) do not provide sufficient information to
disentangle the various relationships that can potentially exist
between reliability and replicability in their original paper.
Instead they simply focus on the first of these possibilities (i.e.,
fixed true-score variance) and thus their conclusions should not
be overgeneralized and only applied to such situations.
EVALUATING RESEARCH FINDINGS
CHARACTERIZED BY LOW LEVELS OF
RELIABILITY
If it is the case that there is no fixed mathematical relation
between reliability and power, then LeBel and Paunonen’s
second recommendation also needs to be re-examined (i.e., that
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FIGURE 2 | Exact power as a function of reliability when error-score
variance is fixed at 1.00.
researchers should “improve those implicit measures having
unacceptable levels of reliability or then utilize implicit measures
known to have acceptable psychometric properties”). To illustrate
this more clearly, imagine that you are a social psychologist
interested in understanding how humans come to like and
dislike novel stimuli. You begin by formulating a relatively
simple hypothesis that evaluative responses to stimuli can be
changed by providing people with verbal information about that
stimulus. To test this hypothesis, you provide a group of thirty
participants with a set of attitude-relevant instructions (e.g.,
“Luupites are good and Niffites are bad”) and another group
of thirty participants with attitude-irrelevant instructions (e.g.,
the basic steps required to waltz at a party). Thereafter, you
administer a test of automatic evaluative responding such as
an IAT wherein participants have to categorize items related to
Luupites and positive words using one response key and items
related to Niffites and negative words using another response
key. In a second block of trials these response assignments
are reversed so that Luupite-related items and negative words
are assigned to the first key while Niffite-related items and
positive words are assigned to the second key. The difference in
performance during the first relative to the second phase (known
as the IAT effect) is considered to provide an overall measure
of how readily people prefer Luupites compared to Niffites (see
De Houwer, 2006; Gregg et al., 2006, for studies along these
lines).
Now imagine that data collection is finished. You create a
scatterplot and regression line using the IAT scores obtained
from the test trials and practice trials for participants in
the two instruction conditions (see Figure 3). Analyses reveal
that participants provided with attitude-irrelevant instructions
displayed a non-significant preference for Niffites over Luupites
(M = −0.25, SD = 0.55) while participants provided with
attitude-relevant instructions display a clear evaluative bias for
Luupites over Niffites (M = 0.68, SD = 0.22). Running a t-test
with a Welch’s correction reveals a significant difference between
the mean preferences of the two experimental conditions,
t(38.11) = 8.54, p < 0.001.
FIGURE 3 | IAT-scores for the practice and test trials for
attitude-relevant (filled circles) and attitude-irrelevant instruction
(white circles) conditions in our hypothetical example. Note that both
practice blocks and test blocks are taken into account for estimating the final
IAT-score.
In-line with Lebel and Paunonen’s (2011) recommendations,
you then estimate the reliability coefficient for both groups using
a bootstrap procedure, wherein 1000 random-splits are drawn
from the data. For each random split, you estimate a correlation
between one split and another. This yields a final reliability
estimate in the form of a Spearman-Brown corrected mean split-
half correlation. Somewhat surprisingly, you observe a higher
reliability estimate for IAT scores in the attitude-irrelevant group
(mean r = 0.92) compared to those in the attitude-relevant
group (mean r = 0.57). The fact that (a) the scores of these
two experimental conditions vary in their reliability estimates
and (b) the reliability estimate obtained in the attitude-relevant
condition is rather low, may cause you as an experimenter, and
the individual reviewing your paper, some concern. But is this
concern really justified?
The low reliability estimate observed in the attitude-relevant
condition tells us that, in this case, local measurement precision
(due to range restriction in the observed scores) is relatively poor:
the relative ordering of participants in this group would probably
change if the test was administered under similar contextual
conditions. Put another way, we have a relatively homogenous
group with respect to the underlying evaluation and our test is
not capable of capturing individual differences within that group.
But note that this was not the original aim of our study (for more
on this point see below). What is important to appreciate here is
that the lower level of reliability in the attitude-relevant compared
to irrelevant condition does not necessarily imply a higher level
of measurement error: if we estimate the group observed-score
variances for the attitude-irrelevant (σ 2X1 = 0.31) and attitude-
relevant instructions conditions (σ 2X2 = 0.05) and input these
values into the reliability formula (σ 2E = σ 2X − ρXX′σ 2X), then the
estimated group error-score variance of the attitude-irrelevant
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group (σ 2E1 = 0.31 − 0.92 ∗ 0.31 = 0.025) appears to be
slightly larger than that of the attitude-relevant group (σ 2E2 =
0.05 − 0.57 ∗ 0.05 = 0.022). In other words, individual IAT-
effects in the attitude-relevant group were estimated with a
similar level of precision as in the attitude-irrelevant group. The
difference in reliability estimates are therefore heavily influenced
by differences in true-score variances.
So is it problematic that we observed a rather low reliability
score in the attitude relevant condition? The answer—like many
in psychological science—is that it depends. Low reliability
scores are problematic only if we were interested in differences
between individuals (within a group) rather than between
groups. Yet in typical experimental designs, including those
that use implicit measures, researchers prefer homogenous
groups. That is, they strive to decrease observed score-
variances within groups or conditions in order to reduce the
impact of individual differences, which usually translates into
lower true-score variances (Nicewander and Price, 1978, p.
407). Such strategies tend to decrease the residual variance
in statistical tests such as t-tests or ANOVAs, and as we
discussed previously, this often results in lower reliability
estimates whenever error-score variances are held constant
(also see Williams et al., 1995). Of course, researchers can
always improve their measure by replacing their existing test
with a tau-equivalent alternative, that is, a comparable test
with similar true- but lower error-scores. Doing so will not
only lead to a more reliable test, but, due to fixed true-
score variance, a more powerful test (as was the case with
LeBel and Paunonen original simulation study; see Nicewander
and Price, 1978). However, by replacing one measure with
another in situations where their true-scores do not correlate
perfectly, researchers introduce uncertainty about the underlying
construct in question. Therefore the claim that “researchers
need to improve those implicit measures having unacceptable
levels of reliability or utilize implicit measures known to have
acceptable psychometric properties” should be interpreted with
caution.
What about the fact that the reliability estimate in the
attitude relevant condition was lower than that in the irrelevant
instructions condition? Although Lebel and Paunonen (2011)
argue that “differences in observed scores across groups cannot
be meaningfully interpreted” in situations where “reliability is
drastically different across conditions” (p. 580), we argue that
even in such cases groups can be meaningfully compared, so
long as differences in reliability estimates are primarily due to
differences in true-score rather than error-score variance (see
DeShon, 2004). Thus, in the current example (where error-scores
were similar), applying a t-test using Welch’s correction will be
robust enough to test hypotheses about meaningful mean group
differences even though those groups differed in their respective
reliability estimates2 .
In short, LeBel and Paunonen’s second recommendation
should be interpreted with care. The take home message here
2For comparingmore than twomeans, a non-parametric tests or Bayesian ANOVA
can be applied (see Kruschke, 2014), although it should be noted that ANOVAs are
rather robust against heteroscedasticity.
is that researchers and reviewers should both be aware that
low levels of reliability are not necessarily due to increased
levels of error-score variance but can also be due to decreased
levels of true-score variance. Likewise, the authors’ suggestion
that some researchers “have been able to easily replicate effects
using certain implicit measures, despite their low reliability”
(p. 579) might reflect the fact that low reliability is sometimes
due to reduced true-score variance rather than increased error-
score variance. Therefore, should researchers try to increase the
reliability of implicit measures? On the one hand, we believe that
low reliability is acceptable when it occurs due to a reduction in
true-score variance. On the other hand, researchers can always
improve their (implicit) measure by reducing error as long as
this reduction does not affect the variance that is due to the
construct of interest. But only by conducting a thorough analysis
of different sources of variance can we disentangle these various
possibilities.
SHOULD RELIABILITY ESTIMATES BE
REPORTED SEPARATELY FOR EACH
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION?
Finally, we agree with the authors that “evaluating (and
reporting) the reliability of scores produced by an implicit
measure should be viewed as a mandatory requirement when
gauging the robustness of a finding” along with the evaluation
of sample size, p-values, and confidence intervals.” Yet for the
reasons noted above, reporting reliability estimates without also
providing at least the mean scores and standard deviations of
the samples (which would allow the reader to infer true—and
error-score variance3 ) is off little value. Moreover, we do not
agree that “reliability estimates should be reported separately
for each experimental condition,” except for situations where
the researcher is interested in individual differences within the
sample of a particular condition.We are thus somewhat surprised
by the example given by LeBel and Paunonen to motivate
their argument (see Figure 5, p. 580). The authors describe a
hypothetical experiment with a control and treatment group
that is not unlike our own example above. It is reasonable
to assume that (a) these two groups do not initially differ
with respect to the underlying attribute of interest or other
task-relevant factors such as demographics, (b) do differ after
the intended manipulation and that (c) this difference can be
observed in their respective implicit test scores. Based on the
reliability index of the entire sample (α = 0.70) and the
scatterplot provided by the authors on p. 580, their test seems
to be a reliable and valid measure of the underlying attribute.
Surprisingly, however, the authors conclude that this reliability
index is “artificially inflated due to group mean differences and
is completely erroneous” (p. 580). They base this conclusion on
the reliability estimates obtained from each of the experimental
conditions (both r < 0.07), both of which lack internal
consistency.
3Note that true-score variance can still be influenced by method specific variance
(systematic error). More advanced psychometric models could be used to
disentangle content specific variance and method specific variance.
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This interpretation seems problematic. In this and other
between-groups experiments, the researcher is not interested
in examining individual differences within either the control
or treatment group. Rather, they are interested in the extent
to which individuals from these two groups differ from one
another and often use a summary measure (e.g., mean) to do
so. Therefore, it seems a little strange to evaluate the implicit
measure based on its capacity to detect individual difference
within each of the two groups. The reliability estimate for the
entire sample and the scatterplot do indicate that the test is
capable of detecting differences in the entire sample. Instead
of being “artificial” in nature, those differences appear to be
due to the intended manipulation and this is illustrated by
the fact that there is only a shift in location between the
two observed distributions. In other words, the test is doing
precisely what the researchers selected it to do. Even if reliability
scores were low within, or differed between experimental
conditions, this would not be a problem provided that—as we
mentioned above—the difference in those reliability estimates
was mainly due to differences in true- rather than error-score
variance.
In short, the above example seems to be inconsistent with
the authors’ recommendations. On the one hand, they suggest
that researchers “must rule out factors that can reduce the
accuracy of reliability estimates, such as the restriction of range
. . . (p. 578)” whenever they want to evaluate the reliability of
an implicit measure. On the other hand, they suggest that a
reliability estimate be calculated for each experimental condition.
But this latter suggestion will likely involve reliability estimates
that are calculated from a restricted range of scores—a direct
contradiction of what the authors recommend above. As we
previously mentioned, experimental research typically involves
the creation of homogenous groups. A consequence of this
is that the range of scores obtained from those groups will
likely be restricted and thus are not representative of those
that would be obtained from a sample representing the entire
population.
DISCUSSION
As Cronbach (1957) eloquently stated “the job of science
is to ask questions of Nature” (p. 671), and in psychology,
these questions have traditionally been asked and answered
in two different ways. On the one hand, the correlational
approach strives to maximize inter-individual variation in order
to explore the relationship between those differences and
the phenomenon of interest (i.e., there is a preference for
heterogeneous samples). This may be in the service of explaining
or predicting when those differences will lead to one outcome
vs. another. In such a context, the researcher is often interested
in maximizing true-score variance so that the test-scores of
different individuals can be meaningfully interpreted. On the
other hand, the experimental approach strives to minimize
inter-individual variation in order to explore the impact of a
particular manipulation on the group as a whole or sub-samples
within that group (i.e., there is a preference for homogenous
samples). This is often to test causal hypotheses and to make
confident causal assumptions about the relationship between
one event and another. In such a context, the researcher is
typically interested in minimizing true-score variance within
conditions so that tests-scores reflect the impact of the intended
manipulation rather than erroneous confounds. Thus depending
on the scientist’s goals and values, the same (implicit) measure
may be characterized as either reliable or unreliable as a
function of how that researcher responds to true-score variance.
High reliability is typically preferable for the correlator while
(ironically) the opposite is true for the experimenter because
this will lead to a more powerful test. Paradoxically, Lebel and
Paunonen (2011) argue that in order to obtain a more powerful
test experimenters should strive to develop and use more reliable
(implicit) measures.
Yet the paradox for the experimenter is that high observed
reliability sometimes leads to more powerful tests and at other
times leads to less powerful tests and this makes any discussion
about fixed, direct or one-to-one relations between reliability and
power or replicability seemingly problematic. On the one hand,
we agree with the authors that when true-score variance is fixed
an increase in error-score variance will decrease the reliability
of a test—and by implication—the likelihood of replication.
However, focusing attention on this situation results in an overly
simplified view of how reliability relates to replicability that is
fraught with conceptual danger (see Nicewander and Price, 1978;
Williams et al., 1995 for related arguments). For instance, our
own analyses show that it is possible to increase the power of a
statistical test (and by implication the likelihood of replication)
by decreasing the reliability of an (implicit) measure (e.g., by
using more homogeneous samples). It is also the case that
implicit measures characterized by low levels of reliability are not
necessarily problematic so long as that reliability is a function
of reduced true-score variance. Moreover, if researchers aim
to explore the reliability of different experimental conditions
and report them separately, then low reliability estimates might
very well be expected, and even desired. In this case the
reliability estimate for the entire sample is not “artificial”
but meaningful insofar as it tells us that the measure is
capable of detecting individual differences given the range of
the true-scores.
Of course we have largely focused on differences in true-
score variances throughout our commentary in order to reinforce
our central message. Nevertheless, we fully acknowledge that
reliability also depends on the amount of error-score variance
and that both correlator and experimenter should strive to
minimize the impact of this factor where possible. Perugini et al.
(2010) discuss some useful strategies (e.g., using standardized
instructions, presenting stimuli in an identical order across
participants) that can reduce error-score variance without
affecting true-score variance. Also, more advanced psychometric
models could be applied to disentangle content specific variance
(i.e., true-score variance) from method specific variance (i.e.,
systematic error-score variance that might influence the true-
score variance). For instance, it is well-known that measures
inferred from raw reaction times can be confounded by general
response speed (Fazio, 1990; Faust et al., 1999). By scaling these
measures by units of standard deviations, the reliability and
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validity of these measures can be increased (Greenwald et al.,
2003; Mierke and Klauer, 2003). Our point is simply that efforts
to control error (both random and systematic) will always be
important and impact the reliability of an implicit measure
in a positive way. But researchers cannot simply equate the
former with the latter as Lebel and Paunonen (2011) suggest.
Instead, researchers should be aware that low reliability is not
always a problem of random measurement error - and in some
instances—might actually reflect tight experimental control.
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